No plan for Afghanistan

"What was needed after December 2001 was a greater emphasis on U.S. special operations troops, supported by light infantry, conducting counterinsurgency operations. Aerial bombardment should have become a rare thing. . . . The failure to adjust U.S. operations in line with the post-Taliban change in theater conditions cost the United States some of the fruits of victory and imposed additional, avoidable humanitarian and stability costs on Afghanistan. . . . Indeed, the war's inadvertent effects may be more significant than we think."

That's from an internal military analysis of the Afghanistan war completed last winter. Written by retired Army Colonel Hy Rothstein, it concludes that "the victory in Afghanistan was not, in the long run, a victory at all."

The report also will not see the light of day, according to Sy Hersh's story in this week's New Yorker.

"Rothstein delivered his report in January. It was returned to him, with the message that he had to cut it drastically and soften his conclusions. He has heard nothing further. 'It's a threatening paper,' one military consultant told me. The Pentagon, asked for comment, confirmed that Rothstein was told 'we did not support all of his conclusions,' and said that he would soon be sent notes. In addition, Joseph Collins told me, 'There may be a kernel of truth in there, but our experts found the study rambling and not terribly informative.' In interviews, however, a number of past and present Bush Administration officials have endorsed Rothstein's key assertions. 'It wasn't like he made it up,' a former senior intelligence officer said. 'The reason they're petrified is that it's true, and they didn't want to see it in writing.'"

Hersh's story tells a story that isn't being covered much these days. Lack of security outside of Kabul, Taliban reforming along the border with Pakistan, and pacts with the devil in which US forces are cutting deals with the very warlords who are threatening (the "mayor of Kabul") Hamid Karzai's government.

Why the failure? Well...

"Then came Iraq. In interviews with academics, aid workers, and non-governmental-organization officials, I was repeatedly told that, within a few months of the Bonn conference, as the United States began its buildup in the Gulf, security and political conditions throughout Afghanistan eroded. In the early summer of 2002, a military consultant, reflecting the views of several American Special Forces commanders in the field, provided the Pentagon with a briefing warning that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were adapting quickly to American tactics. 'His decision loop has tightened, ours has widened,' the briefing said, referring to the Taliban. 'He can see us, but increasingly we no longer see him.' Only a very few high-level generals listened, and the briefing, like Rothstein's report, changed nothing. By then, some of the most highly skilled Americans were being diverted from Afghanistan. Richard Clarke noted in his memoir, 'The U.S. Special Forces who were trained to speak Arabic, the language of al Qaeda, had been pulled out of Afghanistan and sent to Iraq.' Some C.I.A. paramilitary teams were also transferred to Iraq."

Meanwhile, drug lords have begun processing heroin inside country -- traditionally, poppies were sent to Pakistan for processing -- raising fears that GIs stationed in the country, with very little to do, will become heroin addicts.

As with most Sy Hersh stories, it's a harrowing and well-sourced report.

Meanwhile, is it just me, or is the sense of desperation emanating from the Pentagon palpable?