A tale of two Times

Kevin Drum wonders how much attention the US press will give this memo published in the London Times yesterday.

While we knew Andy Card was developing the marketing campaign for the war in Iraq in the summer of '02, never before had I seen the details of the military planning (and lack of aftermath planning) that was in process. From the minutes of a meeting between Tony Blair and his staff in July of '02:

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The New York Times isn't very interested in this memo. In a story this morning, the paper reports on how Iraq haunts Blair at every campaign stop and mentions the following:

But on Sunday, Iraq came back to haunt him yet again in a newspaper article suggesting that he had committed himself to an American plan for "regime change" months before he told either Parliament or the people that British participation in the American-led invasion was all but inevitable.

The article could further damage Mr. Blair because his opponents may use it to renew their assault on his trustworthiness, reviving the argument that he secretly promised President Bush to support the invasion of Iraq.

No mention of the memo itself. No mention that it appeared in the London Times.

I guess Kevin can stop wondering.