Operation October Surprise
More than two years after the Taliban's collapse. One has to ask, what's taken so long to escalate our approach?
"Under the new plan, officials say, the 11,000 American forces in Afghanistan are changing their tactics. Rather than carrying out raids and returning to their bases, small groups will now remain in Afghan villages for days at a time, handing out various forms of aid and conducting patrols. By becoming a more permanent, familiar presence, American officials say, they hope to be able to receive and act on intelligence within hours. Such a technique helped them to capture Mr. Hussein."
Given that Task Force 121 has now left Iraq for Afghanistan, one wonders just how much Iraq has hamstrung the military. I was under the impression, after the Taliban had fallen, that our troops would be making themselves a familiar presence and helping to rebuild the country. But with 10 times that many in Iraq (apparently not enough, either), tough to blanket the country with loving kindness.
That's also why calls to send US troops to Haiti to quell what may soon turn into a humanitarian disaster are not going to get anywhere. As Phil Carter writes, "one has to wonder just what is on the table in the way of U.S. contingency plans for Iraq. This is not 1994 -- we can't load the XVIII Airborne Corps onto planes to back up any sort of diplomatic initiative in Haiti. At most, we could probably muster a MEU to send to Haiti on short notice, or perhaps a piece of a unit that's already redeployed from Iraq. But doing so would have tremendously difficult secondary and tertiary consequences for America's military that's already stretched to hits braking point."
The administration seems to think that if the can convince Aristide to simply step down, there will somehow be an orderly transition to the Port-au-Prince business and professional class that has led the opposition. But it looks a little too late for that, with thugs at the gates of the city and in control of the rest of the country. Former members of the military leadership that Aristide disbanded, these guys aren't simply going to hand over the reins to civilians.
And it says a great deal about the Bush administration's foreign policy when they give the impression that they wouldn't be heartbroken if armed putschists toppled a democratically elected president. Regardless of how unreliable he is, that would be a darkly cynical thing to be seen as encouraging -- as was the case in Venezualia -- in our own hemisphere.
"Under the new plan, officials say, the 11,000 American forces in Afghanistan are changing their tactics. Rather than carrying out raids and returning to their bases, small groups will now remain in Afghan villages for days at a time, handing out various forms of aid and conducting patrols. By becoming a more permanent, familiar presence, American officials say, they hope to be able to receive and act on intelligence within hours. Such a technique helped them to capture Mr. Hussein."
Given that Task Force 121 has now left Iraq for Afghanistan, one wonders just how much Iraq has hamstrung the military. I was under the impression, after the Taliban had fallen, that our troops would be making themselves a familiar presence and helping to rebuild the country. But with 10 times that many in Iraq (apparently not enough, either), tough to blanket the country with loving kindness.
That's also why calls to send US troops to Haiti to quell what may soon turn into a humanitarian disaster are not going to get anywhere. As Phil Carter writes, "one has to wonder just what is on the table in the way of U.S. contingency plans for Iraq. This is not 1994 -- we can't load the XVIII Airborne Corps onto planes to back up any sort of diplomatic initiative in Haiti. At most, we could probably muster a MEU to send to Haiti on short notice, or perhaps a piece of a unit that's already redeployed from Iraq. But doing so would have tremendously difficult secondary and tertiary consequences for America's military that's already stretched to hits braking point."
The administration seems to think that if the can convince Aristide to simply step down, there will somehow be an orderly transition to the Port-au-Prince business and professional class that has led the opposition. But it looks a little too late for that, with thugs at the gates of the city and in control of the rest of the country. Former members of the military leadership that Aristide disbanded, these guys aren't simply going to hand over the reins to civilians.
And it says a great deal about the Bush administration's foreign policy when they give the impression that they wouldn't be heartbroken if armed putschists toppled a democratically elected president. Regardless of how unreliable he is, that would be a darkly cynical thing to be seen as encouraging -- as was the case in Venezualia -- in our own hemisphere.
posted by John at 6:45 PM
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